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Abstract 
 
 
Nozick provides us with a compelling characterization of romantic love, but, as I argue, he under-
describes the phenomenon, for he fails to distinguish it from attitudes that those who are not romantically 
involved may bear to each other. Frankfurt also offers a compelling characterization of love, but he is 
sceptical about its application to the case of romantic love. I argue that each account has the resources 
with which to complete the other. I consider a preliminary synthesis of the two accounts, which I find 
wanting. The synthesis I then favour relies upon two thoughts: (i) each romantic partner has loving 
concern for a plural object viz. the two of them, and (ii) romantic partners are, in addition, beloved of a 
plural subject, viz. the two of them.  A corollary is that Frankfurt is wrong to think that, whilst self-love is 
a pure form of love, romantic love is an impure form of love, for romantic love just is a form of (plural) 
self-love. In an appendix, I defend the coherence of the thought that love can have plural relata.  
 
 
 
I. Romantic Love1 
 
Romantic love, as I understand it, is the form of love appropriate to all and only 
couples. That is not to say that all couples are such that each loves the other in the 
romantic mode: some have never loved each other; others have loved each other, but no 
longer do. Neither is it to say that only couples are such that each loves the other, in the 
romantic mode: circumstances may prevent two lovers from being a couple (Heloise 
and Abelard). My claim is normative: whilst not every couple is a loving couple, every 
couple is such that it is appropriate, or fitting, that each loves the other, in the romantic 
mode; and whilst not every pair of romantic lovers is a couple, every pair of romantic 
lovers is such that it is appropriate, or fitting, that they are a couple. 
 
I cannot specify any condition that is necessary and sufficient for being a couple. A 
candidate condition would be that two people are, in some sense, set on “going through  
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life together” (although not necessarily their whole lives together), but this condition is 
too vague to be especially informative. Many parents and children, and friends, and 
siblings, are likewise set on “going through life together”. And to beef up the proposed 
condition by adding “in the manner distinctive of couples” is to render it circular. For 
two people to be a couple, it is not necessary that they are in, or even that they have 
ever had, a sexual relationship. Neither is it necessary that they live together. It is not 
even necessary that either or both parties wish, or have wished, either to be in a sexual 
relationship, or to live together. Moreover, as far as I can see, these conditions are not, 
either severally or collectively, sufficient for being a couple. 
 
Does it matter that I elucidate romantic love in terms of a concept – the concept of a 
couple – that I cannot elucidate in terms of conditions that are necessary and sufficient 
for its exemplification? No, for we must have some shared understanding of that 
concept, because there is no serious disagreement about its extension. (Compare: it is 
hard to provide conditions necessary and sufficient for being a chair, but we all know a 
chair when, and only when, we see one). Any group of people who share a social circle, 
and who are all equally informed about the goings on within that circle, will agree 
about which pairs of people among the circle are, and are not, couples. More carefully, 
they will agree at least about the non-borderline cases: there can be borderline 
instances, as there can be borderline instances of almost all everyday concepts, but this 
does not impugn our understanding of such concepts.  
 
 
II. Nozick on romantic love 
 
Nozick distinguishes between the “intense state” of being in love, and the “continuing 
romantic love” which “if given the opportunity” any such state “transforms itself into”.2
 
 
Simply put, romantic love has a first stage, with “familiar features” such as 
almost always thinking of the person; wanting constantly to touch and to 
be together; excitement in the other’s presence; losing sleep… gazing 
deeply into each other’s eyes… [etc.]3
 
 
and a second, less piercing, stage. For Nozick, an “important” and “intrinsic” aspect of 
this stage, one that is not merely “something that contingently happens when love 
does”, is “wanting to form a we” with the beloved, and “wanting the other to feel the 
same way about you”.4 He offers no complete account of what it is to want to form a 
“we”, but notes that it involves, among other things, a desire to “pool… autonomy”.5 
And Nozick thinks of autonomy, or, at least, of the autonomy that a lover wishes to 
pool, as consisting in the power and authority to settle certain practical questions by 
making decisions. Hence, in his view, parties pool their autonomy just when they come 
to share the power and authority to thus settle certain practical questions, ones that they 
severally or collectively face. “People who form a we… limit or curtail their own 
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decision-making power and rights”,6 so as to jointly become “a decision-making 
locus”.7 Each “transfers some previous rights to make certain decisions unilaterally into 
a joint pool,… decisions will be made together about how to be together”.8
 
 
There is more to being a we, than this, however. For Nozick, each one of the we 
transfers, as well as some of his own autonomy, some of his own well-being, some of 
his own “public face” and some of his own identity to a “pool”. Nozick is not 
absolutely clear as to what these claims amount to. To take the case of well-being, he 
surely does not mean that each “limits or curtails” his own well-being in order that the 
we acquire one, i.e. that each sees to it that things go worse for him, in order that they 
go better for them. Rather, I take it, the claim is that each party “limits or curtails” his 
capacity to have a well-being that varies independently of the one he shares with the 
other; hence, there is a limit to the extent to which things may go badly for him, whilst 
they go well for them, and vice versa. Something similar appears to apply to the 
pooling of “public face” and of “identity”. Each party “limits or curtails” his propensity 
to be publicly recognized, and recognized as being worthy of such recognition, in order 
that they acquire some such propensity. And each “limits or curtails”, if not his identity, 
his sense of his identity as a discrete, bounded individual, in order that they acquire 
some such sense (“…we might diagram the we as two figures with the boundary line 
between them erased where they come together”).9
 
 
It is perhaps worth noting that, for Nozick, a romantic lover’s desire to form a we 
persists so long as his love does. Even when the desire is fulfilled, it remains present, 
for a lover desires not merely that a we is formed, but that it remains formed. 
 
We should not confuse being a we with being a couple. The former is not necessary for 
the latter: some couples pool scarcely any autonomy, well-being, “face” or identity 
(perhaps such couples are not loving couples). Neither is the former sufficient for the 
latter. Close business or creative partnerships between non-couples may involve 
“poolings” of just the sort described by Nozick. Nor should we assume that Nozick 
thinks that being a we is either necessary or sufficient for “continuing romantic love”. It 
is not necessary, because circumstances can prevent romantic lovers from being a we 
(Heloise and Abelard), and not sufficient because, once again, close business or 
creative partners can be wes, even in the absence of romantic love. 
 
What Nozick claims is that a desire to form a we with the other is a necessary condition 
of stage two romantic love (it is “not.. something that contingently happens when love 
does”).10
 
 I think that we should grant him this claim. Whilst couples may lack this 
desire, loving couples may not. And even when circumstances make being a we 
impossible, as in the case of Heloise and Abelard, it is not implausible to claim that 
love persists only if the desire for the impossible does too, tragically as it may be.  
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Nozick does not assert that a desire to form a we with the other is sufficient for romantic 
love. And, given the above considerations, it is easy to see why desiring this is not 
sufficient. One can desire to form a we with a prospective business or creative partner. 
Also, Nozick himself suggests that such a desire might be present in cases of solidarity, 
e.g. in cases where one works with others in pursuit of a cause, or ideal.11 12
 
 
We should not berate Nozick for failing to supply a sufficient condition, as he does not 
purport to give one. Neither will I give such a condition. But we might hope to do more 
than Nozick does to distinguish romantic love from non-romantic attitudes that may be 
present in business and creative partnerships, and among co-conspirators. I remember a 
time when people used to object to the use of ‘partner’ that signifies the one with whom 
one is a couple. ‘Why call her your partner?’ they would say (and perhaps still do), 
‘You’re not in business’. This was always a fogeyish complaint, conservative about 
English, and, more often than not, about private morality, the implicit rebuke being ‘If 
she isn’t your wife, she bears no significant relation to you’. Nevertheless, there is 
something objectionable about ‘partner’: it under-describes the romantic relationship. 
For romantic partners are partnered in the same way, and to the same extent, as 
business and creative partners may be. All may enter implicit or explicit contracts, or 
strike bargains, that result in their pooling their autonomy, well-being, public “face” 
and identity, in the manner described by Nozick, and all may desire so to do. In 
romantic partnership, however, something else appears also to be present. It is not just 
that, in the case of romantic partners, the contracts and bargains concern important 
domestic matters, such as “where to live, how to live, who friends are and how to see 
them, whether to have children and how many, where to travel, whether to go to the 
movies that night and what to see”.13
 
 After all, non-loving couples may enter such 
contracts, and desire so to do. In romantic partnership, something qualitatively different 
appears also to be present. My complaint against Nozick, then, mirrors the fogy’s 
complaint: he under-describes romantic love, in much the same way as the mentioned 
use of ‘partner’ under-describes the romantic relationship. Even if we cannot beef up 
his necessary condition so as to transform it into a sufficient one, it is worth inquiring 
into whether we can find further necessary conditions of love that distinguish it from 
non-loving attitudes present in partnership. In search of a means of achieving this goal, 
I turn to Frankfurt’s writings. 
 
III. Frankfurt on love 
 
Frankfurt imposes no restriction on the objects of love. The account is meant to apply 
not just to love of people, and not just to love of concrete individuals (e.g. animals, 
countries, paintings etc.) more generally, but to love of “more abstract” things too, such 
as ideals, traditions, projects, causes etc.14 In summarizing Frankfurt’s account, I shall 
try to respect its broad scope. But I shall also follow Frankfurt in using, for brevity’s 
sake, personal pronouns and ‘the beloved’ to designate an object of love.  
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Frankfurt lists “four main conceptually necessary features”15
 
 of love.  
First, “love consists most basically in a disinterested concern for the well-being or 
flourishing of [what] is loved”.16
 
 Such concern is no idle sentiment; it furnishes the 
lover with motives and reasons to protect the interests of the beloved:  
Loving someone or something essentially means or consists in, among 
other things, taking its interests as reasons for acting to serve those 
interests. Love is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons. It creates the 
reasons by which his acts of loving concern and devotion are inspired.17
 
 
Loving concern is disinterested for Frankfurt in that “[i]t is not driven by any ulterior 
purpose”;18 rather, a lover takes the beloved, and the beloved’s well being, to be 
valuable as ends in themselves. This claim is not as simple as it seems. For, as 
Frankfurt sees it, whilst a lover’s concern for his beloved is sometimes a response to his 
valuing him, it is always and necessarily creative of such valuing: “what we love 
necessarily acquires value for us because we love it”.19 Furthermore, whilst loving 
concern is not “driven” by an ulterior purpose, it nevertheless has an ulterior purpose. A 
beloved “necessarily possesses an instrumental value” for a lover,20 as a beloved is a 
necessary condition of a lover’s loving him, which, in turn, is a sufficient condition of 
the lover’s not living a life without love, and not living such a life is of non-
instrumental value to any lover, for a life without love is a life without final ends, and 
hence “empty and vain”.21 So, for Frankfurt, a beloved is a means to a further end of 
his lover’s (the end of having final ends) and, furthermore, may be believed by a lover 
so to be (he imagines a man telling a woman precisely how his love for her gives value 
to his life).22 What prevents loving concern from being “driven” by an ulterior purpose 
is that a beloved, and a beloved’s well-being, have instrumental value for a lover only 
if, and because, these things are valued non-instrumentally by him.23
 
  
Second, loving concern is for a particular qua particular, not a particular qua instance of 
any type(s). Simply put, a beloved is loved “for himself”. For loving concern to exist, it 
is neither necessary nor sufficient that the beloved have any specific qualities. Hence, 
even if a beloved’s qualities change, the concern persists (“Love is not love which 
alters when it alteration finds”), And a lover is not disposed to have loving concern for 
any duplicate of his beloved (“Accept no substitutes”).24
 
 
Third, one “identifies with [one’s] beloved: that is, [one] takes the interests of [one’s] 
beloved as [one’s] own.”25 As one might put it, one inherits, or takes oneself to inherit, 
one’s beloved’s interests, such that one’s well-being or flourishing consists, in part, in 
their well-being and flourishing. To change metaphors, one is “invested in [one’s] 
beloved: [one] profits by its successes, and its failures cause [one] to suffer”.26
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Fourth, loving concern is involuntary, in two ways. First, its occurrence “is not a 
matter of choice but is determined by conditions that are outside our immediate 
voluntary control”.27 Second, its primary manifestation consists in one’s inability to 
form “determined and effective” intentions “regardless of what motives and reasons 
[one] may have for doing so… to perform (or to refrain from performing)” certain sorts 
of action.28 In particular (although Frankfurt does not explicitly put it this way), one is 
unable to effectively will courses of action that one believes would, if taken, harm 
one’s beloved, or hinder his flourishing, and is unable not to will certain courses of 
action that one believes would, if taken, aid one’s beloved or his flourishing, and this is 
so regardless of one’s other motives and reasons. Hence, if I have loving concern for 
my Stradivarius, then I am unable to effectively will that I burn it, no matter how strong 
my motivation to heat my house.29 However, loving concern is not experienced as a 
coercive constraint on the will. Even though “[w]hat we love…is not up to us”,30 “[i]t is 
by our own will, and not by any external or alien force, that we are constrained.”31  
This is, in part, because a lover is satisfied with his love,32 and in part because, 
paradoxical though it may seem, the constraints imposed by love “liberate” the lover 
“from the impediments to choices and action that consist either in having no final ends 
or in being drawn inconclusively both in one direction and in another.”33
 
 
Frankfurt does not say that these “four main conceptually necessary features” are also 
sufficient for love, but he comes to close to doing so, as for him they are “criteria that 
identify what loving essentially is”34 and “indispensible conditions by which the nature 
of love is defined”.35 The list recurs in a predecessor paper “On Caring”, and it is clear 
from what is said there that Frankfurt takes the necessity of the features to distinguish 
love from the genus of which it is a species, viz. concern or caring (or, as he sometimes 
puts it, regarding something as important to one).36 None of the four features is 
necessary for the more general phenomenon, in Frankfurt’s view. Instances of the 
general phenomenon have in common, perhaps among other things, the presence of a 
“second-order” attitude of commitment to, endorsement of, and/or identification with, 
some “first-order” desire that a thing survive and flourish, such that the concerned 
agent is disposed, not only to discern, and act upon, reasons to benefit, and to refrain 
from harming, the object of his concern, but also to “sustain” and “refresh” the desire to 
do this, and to “reinforce” its influence on his behaviour.37 But, in the general case, the 
concerned agent need not have disinterested concern, or be concerned with a particular 
qua particular, or identify with the object of his concern. Neither need his caring 
disposition not be under his direct voluntary control.38
 
 
In Frankfurt’s view “the true interests of anyone… are governed and defined by what 
he loves. It is what a person loves that determines what is important to him.”39 But, in 
his view, it does not follow, and is not true, that love for a person always motivates one 
simply to try to serve his interests by protecting and promoting the things that one 
believes he loves. For first, it will also motivate one to make “a genuine effort” to 
discover and understand what it is that he loves,40 which is often no easy task, not least 
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because what it is that one’s beloved says he loves (if he says he loves anything at all) 
is not necessarily the last word on what it is that he truly loves.41 Second, it will also 
motivate one to free one’s beloved of any ambivalence that pollutes and dilutes his 
love, i.e. to unify his will, where it has become divided, so as to render him whole- and 
not half-hearted.42 Third, in the limiting case in which one’s beloved loves nothing, or 
only a few things, such that his true interests are defined by the non-existence or 
meagreness of what he loves, one’s love will motivate one to assist him in “finding 
things to love”, to rescue him from an “empty and vain” life.43
 
 
 
IV. Frankfurt on self-love and romantic love 
 
For Frankfurt, “self-love – notwithstanding its questionable reputation – is in a certain 
way the purest of all modes of love”.44
 
 The claim is not that self-love is pure in the 
sense of being “noble” or admirable; rather it is pure in that it satisfies Frankfurt’s four 
conditions of love more transparently and decisively than other forms of love. 
First, self-love is distinctively disinterested, in the sense that a self-lover counts no ends 
– and, in particular, no interests – other than those of his beloved, as reasons for willing 
his flourishing. Second, it is distinctively particular: we love ourselves entirely because 
of who we are, and not at all because of how we are. Hence, loving concern for self 
tends to survive even quite dramatic and irreversible qualitative changes to that self, 
and has no tendency at all to spread or transfer itself to qualitative duplicates. This is 
not so transparently or decisively the case when it comes to the love of others. Third, a 
self-lover’s identification with his beloved is distinctively “robust and uncurtailed” 
simply because “his own interests and those of his beloved are identical”.45 Fourth, 
self-love is distinctively involuntary: “[w]hile the inclination [toward self-love] may 
not be completely irresistible, it is exceptionally difficult to overcome or to elude”;46 
after all, it is “deeply entrenched in our nature”.47
 
  
The reason is simple: we are, by nature, lovers. Almost everyone loves something, and 
so is motivated to disinterestedly protect and promote what he loves, and to better 
understand it too. And even one who loves little, or who loves half-heartedly, is, 
typically, motivated to extend the scope and the wholeheartedness of his love. But one 
who is so motivated, Frankfurt suggests, thereby has disinterested, rigidly focused, 
identifying and involuntary concern for the lover of what he loves, and hence loves 
himself. For self-love is, for Frankfurt, manifested by, and derivative of, “loving what 
[one] loves…”,48 “making a determined effort… to become clear about what [one] 
loves, and what that love requires”,49 and struggling to become less divided, more 
wholehearted, in one’s love of other things.50  And so, self-love is the most natural 
thing in the world, a by-product of our propensity to love other things.51
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For Frankfurt romantic love is, however, quite unlike self-love. In the sense of ‘pure’ in 
which the latter is pure, the former is quite impure. As Frankfurt sees it: 
 
…relationships that are primarily romantic or sexual do not provide very 
authentic or illuminating paradigms of love as I am construing it. 
Relationships of those kinds typically include a number of vividly 
distracting elements, which do not belong to the essential nature of love 
as a mode of disinterested concern, but that are so confusing that they 
make it nearly impossible for anyone to be clear about just what is going 
on.52
  
 
What are the alleged “vividly distracting elements”? For Frankfurt, they appear to fall 
into three categories. First, romantic love is typically not disinterested: 
 
The attitudes of romantic lovers towards their beloveds are rarely 
altogether disinterested, and those aspects of their attitudes which are 
indeed disinterested are generally obscured by more urgent concerns that 
are conspicuously or covertly self-regarding.53
 
   
A romantic lover seeks something in return for his love, and for actions expressive of 
his love. Indeed, as Frankfurt sees it, some such desire is apt to cloud the love of one 
who loves anything other than themselves or a child of theirs. Hence: 
 
…the love of persons other than one’s children or oneself is… nearly 
always mixed up with, if not actually grounded in, a hope to be loved in 
return or to acquire certain other goods that are distinct from the well-
being of the beloved – for instance, companionship, emotional and 
material security, sexual gratification, prestige, or the like. It is only 
when the beloved is the lover’s child that love is likely to be as free of 
such calculated or implicit expectations as it is almost invariably free of 
them in the case of a person’s love of himself.54
 
 
The second “distracting element” is the “various powerful emotions”55 that attend upon 
love. These include “strong feelings of attraction”56 and a “yearn[ing] for 
reciprocity”.57 By contrast, love simpliciter, as Frankfurt conceives of it, is not 
primarily or even essentially an “affective” but rather a “volitional” phenomenon.58
 
 
The third distraction is the fact that romantic lovers “often enjoy the company of their 
beloveds” and “cherish various types of intimate connection with them”. By contrast, 
with love simpliciter, it is not “essential that a person like what he loves.”59
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V. A synthesis? 
 
A natural thought is that each of Nozick’s and Frankfurt’s accounts has the resources 
with which to complete the other. What is missing from Nozick’s account, what 
distinguishes romantic partnership from, say, business partnership is the disinterested, 
rigidly focused, identifying and involuntary concern that Frankfurt describes. And what 
accounts for what Frankfurt sees as the vivid distractions of romantic love, is the desire 
to form a we with the other that is, on Nozick’s view, a condition of such love.  
 
As it stands, however, this proposal is not entirely satisfactory. First, even if we add to 
Nozick’s necessary condition of romantic love, the further putatively necessary 
condition that a lover bear Frankfurtian love for his beloved (or, as I shall say, that he 
Frankfurts him), we still do not distinguish it from attitudes that fall short of romantic 
love, but which may be present among business or creative partners. After all, Marks 
and Spencer, say, may have (i) each desired to form a we with the other, and (ii) each 
Frankfurted the other, without bearing any distinctively romantic love for each other. 
And the same is true of Marx and Engels, or Lennon and McCartney.  
 
Secondly, insofar as the proposed synthesis may explain what Frankfurt takes to be to 
be the “conspicuously or covertly self-regarding” “urgent concerns” of romantic lovers, 
in terms of a desire to form a we, it does not explain away Frankfurt’s worry that, to the 
extent to which such love is self-regarding, it is not love.  
 
Nozick has things to say that will dispel this worry, to some extent. For first, lovers’ 
desires to form a we, will, if fulfilled, tend to make them less self-regarding, as their 
autonomy, capacity for well-being and identities will become to some extent merged. 
Secondly, he clearly thinks that such desires are not entirely self-regarding:  
 
…it distorts romantic love to view it through the lens of the egoistic 
question “What’s in it for me?” What we want when we are in love is to 
be with that person… not to be someone who is with her or him.60
 
 
Still, Nozick does not deny, and, at times, asserts that a desire to form a we may, to 
some extent, be “driven by an ulterior purpose”, indeed, by a self-interested concern of 
the sort that economists attribute to economic agents. Hence: 
 
 …someone who loves you helps you with care and comfort to meet 
vicissitudes… Thus, love… provides insurance in the face of fate’s 
blows. (Would economists explain some features of selecting a mate as 
the rational pooling of risks?)61
 
 
And (in an extended passage where he explicitly pursues an economic analogy): 
 
Essays Philos (2011) 12:1                                                                                                          Smith | 77 
 
 
Under some conditions it will be economically advantageous for two… 
trading firms to combine into one firm, with all allocations now 
becoming internal.62
 
 
If the desire to form a we is, even in part, motivated by enlightened self-interest, that 
suffices to justify Frankfurt’s worry that romantic love is impure love. 
 
I think, however, that there is a way to integrate Nozick’s account and Frankfurt’s 
account, in a manner that will both distinguish romantic love from other forms of love 
(as Nozick’s account does not do), and dispel Frankfurt’s worry that romantic love is an 
impure, non-paradigm case of love (as he himself is unable to do). 
 
 
VI. An alternative synthesis 
 
We can profit by paying attention to the ways in which each one of two people who 
love each other, in the romantic mode, benefits from this love. Some of the benefits will 
derive from their capacities to do certain things that one can only do with another, i.e. 
things that one cannot do alone. But this is not the whole truth. There are plenty of 
things that can only be done jointly, from which we derive benefits, regardless of 
whether they are done with a romantic lover. Many of the things lovers do, however, 
bring distinctive benefits just when they are done by loving couples, e.g. having 
children, or seeing a film, or attending yoga classes. But even this is not the whole 
truth. Of especial interest are those activities, such as snuggling up, or holding hands, or 
going for walks, or chatting together about the day’s events, or looking into each 
other’s eyes, or simply rubbing along together (sharing the same space), which are, on 
the face of it, beneficial not because they serve some further end of either party, but 
because the parties accord non-instrumental value to them. When parties engage in such 
activities they do so disinterestedly, for they need have no further end – no 
“completion” – in sight; the activities are valued as ends in themselves, and are so 
simply because they are carried out by one and one’s lover. Moreover, couples derive 
distinctive benefits from discovering new activities of these sorts, or new ways to 
engage in activities of these sorts, new ways to hold and touch and regard each other. 
 
In saying that these activities are performed disinterestedly, I do not mean to deny that 
each party derives pleasure from them. The claim is that neither party engages in these 
activities in order to further some end or interest distinct from the activity itself, 
including the end of experiencing pleasure.63 Or rather, the claim is that this is so just 
when romantic lovers derive distinctive benefits from such activities. The pleasure that 
often accompanies such activities is not unimportant, however. It is important for a 
number of reasons, not least because it confirms each party’s appreciation of the 
activity as valuable: the pleasure provides one with a way of knowing that the activity is 
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indeed valued.64
 
 Still, it is, I submit, a distortion to say that activities of the relevant 
sorts are performed by lovers in order that pleasure be felt. 
In saying that these activities are performed disinterestedly, I do not mean simply to 
deny that they are driven by any self-regarding or egoistic motive. I mean also to deny 
that they are driven by any other-regarding or altruistic motive. It is not just that neither 
party engages in such activity in order to further some end or interest of his own (such 
as that of feeling pleasure). Neither party engages in such activity in order to further 
some end or interest of the other one (such as that of feeling pleasure). 
 
It is for these reasons that I did not include, among my examples, the joint activity 
standardly held to be a paradigm instance of those distinctively engaged in by romantic 
lovers, viz. sex, or “sexual gratification”, as Frankfurt unromantically puts it. 
Sometimes – often, perhaps – when a couple, even a loving couple, has sex, each party 
does have a further end or “completion” in mind: their own orgasm and/or their 
partner’s orgasm. Hence, if we narrow our focus to the case of sex, it is easy to agree 
with Frankfurt that romantic love is beset with “calculated or implicit expectations”. 
But snuggling up, going for walks, and chatting together, are unlike sex in this regard. 
 
The sorts of activities from which business and creative partners, and co-conspirators 
derive distinctive benefits differ importantly from the ones I have mentioned. Even 
when such partners are very close, such that they desire to form a Nozickian we with 
each other, and also Frankfurt each other, the shared activities distinctive of their 
relationships are performed with a further end in sight, be it the closing of a deal, or the 
production of an artwork, or the pursuit of an ideal or cause.  
 
What is the best explanation of the fact that romantic lovers value engaging in certain 
shared activities, and finding new ones to engage in, as ends in themselves, whereas 
business and creative partners, even loving business and creative partners do not? 
Presumably, it is a difference in the ways in which such partners love each other. But, I 
hazard, neither Frankfurt nor Nozick can plausibly thus explain the difference. 
 
Consider Frankfurt first of all. Since the activities are pursued with no further end in 
sight, it cannot be that, in engaging in them, either party is acting on the reasons given 
to him by his Frankfurtian love for the other, i.e. that he acts in order serve the other’s 
interests or flourishing. For the same reason, it cannot be that he acts in order to serve 
his own interests or flourishing. Frankfurt might take a more nuanced view, however. 
He might say that whilst lovers do not participate in such activities in order to serve 
such interests, they value such activities because they express love for the other, and/or 
love for oneself, and/or the hope and expectation that one is beloved of the other. I 
reply that, whilst such activities are plausibly held to be valued because they play an 
expressive role, what are expressed are not attitudes of these sorts. For attitudes of these 
sorts are expressed by one’s doing something for or to the beloved, whilst (as one 
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hopes) they do something similar for or to one. And this is a forced, unnatural way of 
describing the activities in question. They are more naturally described as the doing of 
something with another (e.g. chatting with them, walking with them etc.). It is hard to 
see how doing something with another can be expressive of concern one has for them, 
or for oneself, or of a hope that such concern is returned.  
 
Now consider Nozick. One might think that he is in a better position to account for the 
distinctive value that lovers ascribe to the relevant activities. For he may say that the 
activities are valued because they express the shared autonomy, well-being and identity 
that the romantic lovers have and desire to continue to have. No doubt there is some 
truth in the observation that the activities express a shared well-being and identity. But, 
first, this doesn’t account for their distinctive value, for, again, the activities of business 
and creative partners, and co-conspirators, can play a similarly expressive role. And, 
second, it is hard to see how such activities could express a shared autonomy, 
conceived of, à la Nozick, as a capacity for joint decision. For, more often than not, 
agents do not jointly decide to engage in such activities, and, by so doing, settle open 
practical questions that they severally or collectively face.  Rather, they feel bound to 
engage them. If anything, it is not a shared capacity for choosing, but constraints on 
capacities to choose, that the activities express. They are valuable, in part, because the 
parties could not but engage in them, on at least some occasions when the opportunity 
arises. As Frankfurt might put it, each is unable to form “determined and effective” 
intentions “regardless of what motives and reasons he may have for doing so… to 
perform (or to refrain from performing)”. Hence, sometimes, no matter how urgent the 
requirement to clean the house, or get on with one’s work, snuggling up, chatting 
together, and so on are irresistible. Nevertheless these constraints are not experienced 
as coercive. Again, as Frankfurt might say, “[i]t is by our own will, and not by any 
external or alien force, that we are constrained.”   
 
These considerations suggest a hypothesis. Each lover participates, with the other, in 
doing things of the mentioned sorts out of Frankfurtian love: his love for the activities, 
which, in turn, is expressive of his love for the plurality of agents of them. The latter 
love has the four features Frankfurt lists, it is disinterested, rigidly focussed, identifying 
and involuntary. But it has, as its object, a plurality of people, oneself and one’s 
partner. It is neither other-directed nor self-directed but self-and-other-directed. As 
Krebs has nicely said, “Love is neither altruistic nor egoistic; it is “nostristic””.65
 
 
The hypothesis accommodates Frankfurt’s view almost completely. He is quite right 
about the nature of love, according to the hypothesis. It is just that he overlooks the 
possibility that love may have a plural object. In particular, he overlooks the possibility 
that each one of two lovers may love, not just the other but the two of them, 
collectively. Such love, I hypothesise, is distinctive of romantic love, it finds expression 
in doing things, of the sort described, with one’s beloved, things valued for themselves, 
simply because they are expressive of such love for a plurality. 
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The hypothesis also accommodates Nozick’s account in the following way. Whilst he is 
right to say that lovers want to form and sustain a we, what he neglects to observe is 
that something distinctive of romantic love is that the desire in question is no mere 
desire; it is Frankfurtian loving concern, which is, unlike the desires to form wes had by 
business or creative partners, both a disinterested, and an involuntary one.  
 
Let me try to further explain the hypothesis by way of an analogy. Consider the giving 
of token gifts. One gives a token gift – a birthday card perhaps – not always in order 
that the recipient derive pleasure from the gift, or even from its receipt. Often one 
knows that little pleasure will be had. Rather, one judges that gift-giving is non-
instrumentally valuable as an expression of one’s love, a “token of one’s affection”, as 
it is said.66
 
 Likewise, one sometimes gives oneself a gift, for much the same reason. 
When one “treats oneself” to a hot bath, or new item of clothing, or walk in the woods, 
one’s reason is sometimes likewise expressive: the treat is non-instrumentally valuable 
as an expression of one’s loving concern for oneself (“because I’m worth it”). 
Likewise, I want to suggest, the sorts of shared activities under discussion resemble 
token gifts given, collectively, by a loving couple, to themselves. And they possess 
non-instrumental value as expressions of their loving concern for themselves.  
The hypothesis seems to me to accord with the phenomenology of engaging in the sorts 
of activities that I have specified. What one feels is not ‘I do this with you because I 
Frankfurt you, and I’m hopeful that you do this with me, for the same reason’. Rather, 
it is ‘We are doing this because each of us Frankfurts us’. In other words, the feeling 
that characteristically accompanies such activities is that they are expressive of a loving 
concern that the each of the parties bears towards them (plural). 
 
Moreover, the hypothesis accounts for the fact that romantic partners do not merely 
value engaging in shared activities of the sort described, they also value discovering 
new activities of these sorts, or new ways to engage in activities of these sorts. For 
recall that, for Frankfurt, love motivates one, not merely to protect and promote the 
things loved by one’s beloved, but to make “a genuine effort” to discover and 
understand what they love, to free them of ambivalence regarding what they love, and 
(where they love nothing) to assist them in “finding things to love”. In just the same 
way, it seems to me, each of two romantic lovers are motivated, not only to protect and 
promote the things that they love to do together, but to try hard to understand what 
these things are, to free themselves of ambivalence regarding them, and (in the limiting 
case where they struggle to find any activities that they love to do together) to assist 
them in finding things that they love. Furthermore, this project is not merely one of 
discovering things that they each love, but one of finding things that they together love. 
In short, just as a lover wishes an individual whom he loves to be wholehearted with 
regard to what he loves, so a romantic lover wishes the plurality whom he loves to be, 
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as it were, collectively wholehearted with regard to the things that they love. This, I 
take it, is the truth in the cliché that two hearts may become one. 
 
My proposal might be developed by exploiting Nozick’s distinction between (as I have 
put it) stage one and stage two romantic love. At stage one, when the love is still 
“blossoming”, it is characteristically accompanied by uncertainties. The lover is unsure 
as to whether he “really” loves the beloved, and as to whether he is “really” loved in 
return. He is unsure as to whether he and the beloved are right for (suited to, compatible 
with, good enough for) each other. Such uncertainty is one cause of the hunger and 
excitement that is characteristic of being in love: a hunger to find out more about the 
beloved, and also, about oneself, and excitement at the prospect of future encounters. 
But it can also generate anxiety: the fear that one may be making a mistake, or taking a 
considerable risk. As a consequence, those at this stage typically love hesitantly, even 
querulously. These uncertainties and their concomitant excitements and anxieties can 
account for many of the “distractions” described by Frankfurt: the strong emotions, the 
enjoyment of the other’s company, together with its disinterested aspect. A lover at 
stage one does indeed seek something in return: what he seeks is that he be loved in 
return, a matter regarding which he is uncertain.  
 
At stage two, however, uncertainty has lapsed, and its concomitant distractions have 
too. No doubt some strong emotions and enjoyment of the other’s company are still 
typically present, but no more “distractingly” so than they are in the case of parental 
and self-love. What is still undeniably present are “urgent concerns” and “hopes” of the 
sort that trouble Frankfurt e.g. for “companionship, emotional and material security, 
sexual gratification, prestige, or the like”. But Frankfurt is wrong to view these as 
“conspicuously or covertly self-regarding”, and hence as contaminating the love that 
(as he allows) is present. For each stage two lover desires that these goods be acquired, 
not by him, and not by his beloved, but by them, collectively, and does so because he 
loves them, collectively. Strictly speaking, no doubt, Frankfurt is right to allege that 
each lover desires something “distinct from the well-being of the beloved”, if by 
‘beloved’ is meant, one’s partner in love. But it is likewise distinct from the lover’s own 
well-being: what is desired is their well-being. Moreover, whilst their well-being is 
distinct from the well-being of either one of them, it is not disjoint from it: after all, 
each one of them is one of the couple whose flourishing is desired.  
 
In summary, it may be conceded to Frankfurt that stage one romantic love contains 
“elements, which do not belong to the essential nature of love as a mode of 
disinterested concern”. It may also be conceded that these elements distract romantic 
lovers. Indeed, they may drive them to distraction. But they need not distract the 
theorist. It is an overstatement to say that these elements are “so confusing that they 
make it nearly impossible for anyone to be clear about just what is going on”. Whilst 
they may make it hard for the lovers to know what is going on, the theorist ought not to 
be confused. All that is going on, at stage one, is the blossoming of love, as conceived 
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of by Frankfurt, accompanied by the uncertainty characteristic of such blossoming – 
such love is imperfectly disinterested insofar as it is fragile and new. At stage two, 
there is yet another love: love for the couple. There is now no disinterested element. 
Granted, each lover wants to be with his partner, but not in order that he do something 
to or for him, in the hope or expectation of something “in return”. The “yearnings” are 
not for “reciprocity”; they are for togetherness, and for its flourishing. 
 
Of course, I do not mean to deny that those who love each other, in the romantic mode, 
have various egoistic motivations. What I mean to deny is that these are provided by, or 
in any way “mixed up with” their love. The necessities of living together, as many 
couples do, require one to enter mutually advantageous contracts, and to strike mutually 
advantageous bargains, out of enlightened self-interest. But the necessities of romantic 
love do not require that one ever acts out of plain self-interest. 
 
What I have suggested so far is that we should think of romantic love as consisting in 
inter alia Frankfurtian love that each romantic partner has for the two of them. As one 
might put it, they are collectively beloved of each one of them. But it seems to me that, 
when romantic love flourishes, they are also, collectively, the lovers of themselves. For 
just as, as Frankfurt observes, one who loves other things, and who is motivated to 
better understand what he loves, and to extend both the scope and the wholeheartedness 
of his love, thereby loves himself, so, any couple who share a love for other things, and 
who are motivated to better understand what it is that they love, and to extend both the 
scope and the wholeheartedness of their shared love for other things, thereby, 
collectively, love themselves. Just as for one “[t]o be wholehearted [about what one 
loves] is to love oneself”67
 
, so, for any couple to be collectively wholehearted about 
what they jointly love is for them to collectively love themselves.  
A final corollary ought to be noted. Recall that, for Frankfurt, whilst self-love is pure, 
romantic love is impure. We are now in a position to see that, unless we unduly restrict 
our conception of self-love, this claim is self-contradictory. For romantic love is self-
love. What it is not is singular self-love, i.e. an instance of a person’s loving himself. 
What it is is plural self-love, i.e. an instance of some persons’ loving themselves. 
Hence, if Frankfurt meant to speak quite generally about self-love, then his judgement 
that self-love is “the purest of all modes of love” is correct if and only if his judgement 
that romantic love is impure is incorrect. If, on the other hand, Frankfurt intended his 
claim of purity to apply only to cases of singular self-love, then nothing in what he has 
to say about such love, or about romantic love, supports his claim. At the very least, if 
what I have said is right, he owes us an explanation of why the love of one for oneself 
is pure, when the love of many for themselves is impure. My challenge to him is this: 
how can a difference of number make for one of purity? 
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VII. Friendship 
 
I have deliberately said little about friendship. My overriding concern has been to 
distinguish romantic love from the attitudes present in business and creative 
partnerships, and among co-conspirators. We saw that neither a Nozickian desire to 
form a we, not Frankfurtian love of one for the other sufficed for such a distinction. 
What I have suggested is that plural Frankfurtian love, held, by the lovers, for 
themselves does suffice. But it may be thought that close friends also plurally 
instantiate self-love, in just the manner, and for just the reasons, that I have described. 
 
I reply as follows. Whilst it is true that close friends may participate in plural self-love, 
they do not typically desire to form a Nozickian we each with the other. They may, of 
course, like romantic lovers, and business and creative partners, wish to “pool 
autonomy” to some extent, but they typically do not desire to pool their “public faces” 
and their “identities”: they do not want to “limit or curtail” their propensities to be 
publicly recognized, in order to collectively acquire some such propensity, or to “limit 
or curtail” their identities as individuals, in order to collectively some such identity. 
Hence the Nozickian desire is critical in distinguishing romantic love from the love of 
friends, just as plural Frankfurtian loving concern is critical in distinguishing it from the 
love of close associates. The reader will notice that I choose my words carefully. I say 
that friends do not typically have the Nozickian desire. What I now grant is that when 
and insofar as they have it, and also have Frankfurtian love (both each for the other, 
and of the plural reflexive variety), they do qualify as romantic partners, albeit romantic 
partners of a distinctively chaste variety. I am satisfied with this corollary. As is 
illustrated by the cases of Butch and Sundance, Sebastian and Charles, and Holmes and 
Watson, friendship can have a romantic cast.  
 
 
VIII. A logico-metaphyiscal appendix: the coherence of the notion of plural self-
love 
 
Some readers may be sceptical of the claim that love can be borne by anything other 
than an individual, to anything other than an individual. To them I offer this appendix. 
Loving is a textbook example of a non-symmetric dyadic relation. By that two things 
are standardly meant:   
 
(1) The relation has two argument places for the things that it relates. 
(2) The relation differentially applies to the occupants of its two 
            places. 
 
The standard way of understanding claim (1) is that loving is an incomplete entity. 
More particularly, it has two “gaps”. The relation is completed or “saturated” just when 
those gaps are filled, and they are filled just when the relation relates something that 
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loves, to something it loves. Finally, since loving is a universal, not a particular, there 
is, in principle, no limit to the number of occasions of its completion. 
 
The standard way of understanding claim (2) is as follows. The relation of loving is 
inherently directional. Hence, whenever it relates things, it applies to the things it 
relates (the occupants of its argument places) in a given order. Hence, as it is 
sometimes put, whenever the relation is saturated, whatever occupies the first place 
bears the relation to whatever occupies the second place. A symmetric two-place 
relation is such that, for any things that saturate it, it applies to them in both directions. 
Hence, quite generally, it does not differentially apply to things. Or (to amend the letter 
but not the spirit of that claim), it applies differentially to any things it relates, but in 
both possible ways. A non-symmetric relation is not thus symmetric. It is not the case 
that for any things that saturate it, it applies to them in both directions. Hence, quite 
generally, it does differentially apply to things. Alternatively put, it is not the case that, 
for any things it relates, it applies differentially to them, in both possible ways. That is 
why if I love you, it does not follow that you love me.68
 
 
I have laboured these familiar points so as to distinguish them from a dogma with 
which they are often associated, but which they do not entail. The dogma is this: 
 
(3) An argument place is a place for exactly one thing. 
 
I call it a dogma because (a) it is widely accepted; (b) it is unsupported by the 
theoretical assumptions underlying (1) and (2); and (c) it is contradicted by our pre-
theoretical intuitions regarding dyadic relations, and n-adic relations more generally.  
 
 Re: (a), I have nothing to add to what other dissenters have noted. MacBride reports 
that in the Principia, Russell and Whitehead classify universals according to the 
number of entities by which they may be completed, thereby assuming without 
argument that, for any universal, there is some unique number of entities with which it 
combines. The assumption does not yet entail (3), but does when recast as a subtly 
stronger one (one which, as MacBride reports, has became “fossilized in the textbook 
strata”), viz. that for any relation, the (supposedly) unique number of entities by which 
it may be completed also numbers its argument places.69 Oliver and Smiley suggest that 
the rot set in even earlier, first in Peirce’s claim, in his “The Logic of Relatives”, that 
“every relationship concerns some definite number of correlates”, defended by what 
Oliver and Smiley call a “lame” analogy with a particular theory of chemical valency 
contested even in Peirce’s time, and long since discredited, and later in Frege, who, 
whilst mostly concerned with predicates, not the relations or (on his view) functions 
they name, restricted his focus to ones that always combine with a fixed number of 
singular variables or terms, and sought to analyse away natural language sentences that 
appear to use predicates of a different sort.70 As MacBride, and Oliver and Smiley, 
lament, the influence of these founders of modern logic on our thinking about relations, 
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which has, in part been mediated by their influence on more recent influential authors 
like Armstrong,71 Dummett72 and Strawson,73
 
 has been immense. 
Re: (b), the theory underlying (1) is of childlike simplicity. The main theoretical 
primitive is the notion of a gap, a gap that may be plugged. And as any workman 
knows, in the ordinary way of things, a gap may be plugged by many things as easily as 
it may be plugged by one. Similar remarks apply to the theory underlying (2). The main 
theoretical idea is that of discriminable gaps, gaps that may be distinguished either by 
their order, or intrinsic nature, or in some other way.74
 
 But again, as any workman 
knows, in the ordinary way of things, each one of some discriminable gaps may be 
plugged by many things as easily as it may be plugged by one. Hence, nothing in the 
theory that underlies (1) and (2) should give succour to (3). 
Re: (c), it suffices to list some counter-examples. Fighting is dyadic. It has a gap for 
whomsoever fights and a gap for whomsoever is fought. But, as Morton noted, each gap 
may be filled by more than one thing. As he writes “…it can relate, say, four objects 
(‘Adam and Bill fought… Yuri and Zero’).”75 Likewise, causing is dyadic.76 It has a 
gap for whatever it is that causes and a gap for whatever it is that is caused. But, as 
MacBride notes, each gap may be filled by more than one thing. A man’s death may be 
caused by a plurality of events. And such a plurality may have a plurality of effects, of 
which the man’s death is but one. Hence as MacBride puts it, the relation “appears to 
relate different numbers of contributory causes to their joint effects”.77
 
  
It may be countered that the fighting relation has gaps, not for “whomsoever” fights and 
is fought, but for a person (or animal) that fights, and a person (or animal) that is 
fought. Likewise, it may be objected and that the causing relation has gaps, not for 
“whatever it is” that causes and is caused, but for an event (or state of affairs etc.) that 
causes, and an event (or state of affairs etc.) that is caused. But the objection begs the 
question in favour of (3). There is no antecedent reason to doubt that, whenever a 
relation of fighting or causing is instantiated, its arguments are divided, by its argument 
places, not necessarily into two things, but into two groupings of things, groupings of, 
in principle, any cardinality. After all, I may think of whomsoever is at the door without 
prejudice as to their number: perhaps it is the postman at the door, perhaps it is some 
carol singers. And I may think of whatever I eat for breakfast tomorrow without 
prejudice as to its number: perhaps I will eat a cereal bar, perhaps I will eat some 
apples. Likewise, I may think of whomsoever fights, whomsoever is fought, whatever it 
is that causes, and the like, without prejudice as to their number. And that I may is 
evidence that these relations may relate some things to some things. 
 
Similar points may be made about other n-adic relations. Sitting in a circle is monadic: 
it has a single gap for whomsoever sits in a circle. But this gap can be filled by any 
number of things. A flexible man can sit in a circle, but so can thirty schoolchildren. 
Introducing is triadic: it is has a gap for whomsoever introduces, a gap for whomsoever 
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is introduced and a gap for those to whom the introduced are introduced. But each gap 
can be filled by any number of things. Bill can introduce Barack to George, but, 
equally, the Clintons can introduce the Obamas to the Bushes. 
 
It may be objected that these alleged counter-examples do not refute (3). All they show 
is that many predicates have “gaps” each of which may be filled by a list of several 
terms, or by a term for a list of several things, i.e. a plural term. And, it may be urged, 
the existence and natures of predicates are an unreliable guide to the existence and 
nature of corresponding properties and relations. After all, ‘is not self-instantiated’ 
corresponds with no property, on pain of a version of Russell’s paradox. 
  
I reply that whilst predicates are not the last word, they are the first word,78
 
 in that, if a 
predicate does not correspond with a property or relation, then there is an intuitive or 
theoretical reason why. In the case of ‘is not self-instantiated’ a reason may be given, 
but I see no such reason in the case of ‘fought’, ‘caused’, and the like. 
An objector may persist, however. He may say that even though the theory underlying 
(1) and (2) does not support (3) and our pre-theoretic intuitions contradict it, it is 
nevertheless more credible than its negation, on general theoretical grounds. For a 
world in which it is true is simpler than one in which it is false; since simplicity is a 
virtue in a hypothesis, we have good reason to accept (3), rather than its negation. 
 
I reply that simplicity is but one of the theoretical virtues. Another is explanatory 
power, which includes the power to “save the appearances”. Another is ontological 
economy. As far as I can see, the defender of (3) cannot save the appearance that 
relations like fighting and causing each sometimes relate some things to some things, 
except by offending against ontological economy. I now explain why.  
 
Surely the most promising strategy for saving the appearances would be to find a way 
of showing that any truth that appears to predicate fighting, causing, or any like 
relation, of, in the first place, some things, and, in the second place, some things (or of, 
in the first place, some thing, and, in the second place, some things, or of, in the first 
place, some things, and, in the second place, some thing) may be analysed as one in 
which the relation is only ever predicated of, in the first place, a thing, and, in the 
second place, a thing. If this could be shown, then it would perhaps be reasonable to 
assume that any such analysans is a more perspicuous report than its analysandum, 
because the former and not the latter is consistent with (3), and simplicity is a virtue. 
 
This is not the place for an exhaustive survey of every conceivable attempt at such 
analysis.79
 
 Suffice it to say that the most immediately plausible strategies of analysis 
either deliver an analysans that is inequivalent to its supposed analysandum, or offend 
against ontological economy. To see this, consider again Morton’s example: 
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 (i) Adam and Bill fought Yuri and Zero 
 
At a first attempt, (i) might be analysed thus: 
 
(ii) Each one of Adam and Bill fought at least one of Yuri and Zero, and 
          Each one of Yuri and Zero was fought by at least one of Adam and Bill 
 
…which could be further analysed as a conjunction of disjunctions, thus: 
 
(iii) Either Adam fought Yuri or Adam fought Zero, and  
          either Bill fought Yuri or Bill fought Zero, and  
          either Yuri was fought by Adam or Yuri was fought by Bill, and 
          either Zero was fought by Adam or Zero was fought by Bill. 
 
But neither (ii) nor (iii) is equivalent to (i) as there are circumstances in which (i) is true 
and (ii) and (iii) false. For there are possible circumstances in which (i) is true, but in 
which neither Adam nor Bill fights anyone by himself. For Adam and Bill might 
together operate a two-man weapon (e.g. a piece of heavy artillery operable only by 
two people). Furthermore, it might at the same time be the case that Yuri and Zero 
together operate a like weapon, such that each pair forms a unified target for the other 
pair. So it is possible that neither Yuri nor Zero is by himself fought by anyone. Hence 
(i) can be true in circumstances in which each conjunct of (ii) and (iii) is false. 
 
I see no way to patch this problem. And whilst other analyses are possible, e.g. 
 
(iv) A composite object (call it a team) made up of Adam and Bill fought a   
          composite object (call it a team too) made up of Yuri and Zero, 
 
or 
 
(v) An event of fighting was such that Adam partook of it (qua agent), and 
          Bill partook of it (qua agent), and Yuri partook of it (qua patient) and   
          Zero partook of it (qua patient), and no other people partook of it, 
 
these offend against ontological economy by explicitly quantifying over entities –  
teams in the one case, events in the other – to which (i) is not explicitly committed. 
 
This completes my case for (3)’s being a dogma that should not be assumed. Hence, 
whilst loving is a non-symmetric dyadic relation, relating something that loves to 
something loved, we should not assume that it always relates some thing that loves to 
some thing loved. In particular, we should not assume that it never relates some things 
to themselves, that is, that on no occasion of its completion it is completed by, in the 
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first place, some things, and, in the second place, those things. If the foregoing is right, 
an instance of romantic love is an instance of plural self-love, thus conceived. 
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